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THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY
EXCEPTION TO MIRANDA UNDER
NEW YORK V. QUARLES
Alan Raphaelt
In New York v. Quarles' the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced an exception to the rule established in Miranda v. Ari-
zona.2 Miranda bars the use of any statement in the prosecution's
case in chief obtained during custodial interrogation unless the
suspect has first been advised of his or her constitutional right
against self-incrimination 3 and has voluntarily waived that right.
4
t Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. J.D., 1979, Indiana
University School of Law; Ph.D., 1972, University of Chicago; M.A.; 1968, University of
Chicago; B.A., 1966, Haverford College.
1 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. Prior to interrogation, a person in custody must be
clearly informed that: (1) he has the right to remain silent; (2) anything he says can
be used against him in court; (3) he has the right to the presence of an attorney at the
questioning; and (4) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for him by
the court. Id. at 444. There must be a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of
these rights for the interrogation to continue. Id. at 479. If these criteria are not met,
any statements made by the defendant are inadmissible at trial in the prosecution's
case in chief. Id.
When a person is not in custody, the police may question him/her as part of
their investigation and may introduce elicited answers into evidence if that person is
subsequently charged with a crime. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 433
(1984). Questioning of a suspect in custody, however, must conform to the guide-
lines set forth in Miranda outlined above.
A suspect is considered to be in custody when "a 'formal arrest or restraint or
freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest" has taken place.
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655 (citation omitted). Express questioning or its functional
equivalent constitutes an interrogation. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301
(1980). A "custodial interrogation [therefore is] questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (citations omit-
ted). The test is whether the police should have known that their statements to the
suspect or from the suspect "were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (citation omitted).
The Innis court determined that an arrestee's response to a conversation he over-
heard between two police officers regarding the dangers of a gun previously held by
the suspect toward handicapped children did not constitute an interrogation. Id. at
302. Miranda requirements therefore did not apply, and the arrestee's statement
about the gun's location was admissible as evidence. Id. at 302-03. By contrast, in
Quarles, the police directly questioned the defendant regarding the location of a gun.
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652. Under Innis, this would constitute express questioning. In-
nis, 446 U.S. at 300-01.
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Quarles established a public safety exception to Miranda (the "ex-
ception") which allows the admission of otherwise barred state-
ments where police questioning is "necessary to secure their own
safety or the safety of the public .... ." This article will discuss the
application of the exception in the thirteen years since the
Supreme Court decided Quarles. It will point out the limited de-
gree to which courts have extended the exception beyond the
bounds set forth by the Supreme Court. This article will also dis-
cuss a related exception for questioning in emergency situations
involving hostages and other persons at risk.
I. BACKGROUND
Familiarity with the facts of Quarles are essential to understand-
ing the scope of the exception. Shortly after midnight, a young
woman approached a police patrol car and informed the officers
that a man armed with a gun had just raped her.6 She further in-
formed the police that the suspect had entered a nearby supermar-
ket.7 The police entered the supermarket, spotted a man who
matched the woman's description, and apprehended him after a
brief pursuit.' The police handcuffed and frisked the suspect, Ben-
jamin Quarles, who wore an empty holster but did not possess a
gun.9 One of the officers inquired as to the location of the gun,
and Quarles told him where to find it, saying "the gun is over
there.""° The police recovered the loaded gun where Quarles indi-
cated it would be. 1 Quarles was subsequently charged with crimi-
The use of collateral statements made in violation of Miranda has been held to be
permissible at trial. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971). Specifically, state-
ments obtained in violation of Miranda may be used for impeachment purposes (i.e.,
such statements may not be used substantively in the prosecution's case in chief, but
may be used by the prosecution to impeach statements made by the defendant during
direct examination). Id. at 224. In addition, the prosecution may use otherwise inad-
missible statements to impeach statements made in response to proper cross examina-
tion. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980).
Statements in violation of the Miranda rule may also be used in grand jury pro-
ceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); in sentencing proceedings,
United States v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971); parole revocation hearings, United States ex
rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970); and warrant applications,
United States v. Patterson, 812 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1987).
5 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659.
6 Id. at 651-52.
7 Id.





THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION
nal possession of a weapon. 2 The defendant sought to have his
statement indicating the location of the gun, and the gun itself,
suppressed.13 The motion to suppress was granted by the trial
court and upheld by the appellate courts of New York. 4
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
hibits the use of any statement obtained by compulsion against a
defendant in a criminal case. 5 Miranda warnings serve to dispel a
suspect's inherent compulsion to respond to police questioning
while in custody. Miranda warnings must be given before a suspect
answers questions during a custodial interrogation in order to ad-
mit his/her response into evidence at trial.16 Under Miranda,
Quarles' statement and the recovered gun were properly sup-
pressed because the statement was obtained during a custodial in-
terrogation conducted in violation of Miranda requirements.
17
The United States Supreme Court, however, granted New
York State's petition for certiorari in Quarles and overturned the
Court of Appeals' decision.18 The statement and gun were deemed
admissible under the public safety exception. 9 The Court indi-
cated that the exception to Miranda would apply to police ques-
tions objectively necessary to protect either the police or the public
from immediate danger.20 After the police obtain the information
12 Id.
13 Id. at 649, 656.
14 People v. Quarles, 447 N.Y.S.2d 84 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1981), affd, 444
N.E.2d 984 (N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655.
17 Id. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Quarles, agreed with the
majority in admitting the gun. She argued, however, that the defendant's statement
as to where the gun was located should have been suppressed because "[t]he harm
caused by failure to administer Miranda warnings relates only to admission of testimo-
nial seif-incriminations, and the suppression of such incriminations should by itself
produce the optimal enforcement of the Miranda rule." Id. at 669 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Furthermore, when an interrogation provides leads to other evidence it
"does not offend the values underlying the Fifth Amendment privilege any more than
the compulsory taking of blood samples, fingerprints, or voice exemplars, all of which
may be compelled in an 'attempt to discover evidence that might be used to prose-
cute [a defendant] for a criminal offense."' Id. at 671 (quoting Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966)).
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the question of whether phys-
ical evidence obtained as a result of a statement taken in violation of Miranda should
be admitted into evidence, although the issue has been presented to the Court. See
United States v. Patterson, 812 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 922
(1988) (holding that unwarned voluntary statements made after coerced statements
were properly used in an affidavit for a search warrant).
18 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 660.
19 Id. at 657.
20 The Court explained that Miranda would not penalize officers for "asking the
1998]
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needed to neutralize the threat to public safety, they must then
give the suspect Miranda warnings before engaging in further ques-
tioning.21 The Quarles majority indicated that the exception is to
be applied in emergency situations only.22 Whether the exception
is applicable depends upon a court's objective assessment of the
facts facing the police officer at the moment of questioning. The
analysis does not turn upon the officer's subjective motivation.23
In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and
Stevens, found the majority's departure from Miranda "troubling"
for several reasons. 24 First, Justice Marshall stated, "the majority
proposes to protect the public's safety without jeopardizing the
prosecution of criminal defendants. I find in this reasoning an un-
wise and unprincipled departure from our Fifth Amendment
precedents." 25 He asserted that police, as a result of Quarles, could
very questions which are the most crucial to their efforts to protect themselves and the
public." Id. at 658 n.7. The Quarles Court distinguished the facts before it from those
in Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 324-25 (1969). Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8. In
Orozco, the Court suppressed statements made by a suspect concerning a gun used in a
murder four hours earlier. Orozco, 394 U.S. at 324-25. Police surrounded the suspect
and questioned him at length in his boardinghouse room in the middle of the night.
Id. at 325.
According to Justice Rehnquist, Orozco and Quarles were consistently decided
because:
In Orozco ... the questions about the gun were clearly investigatory; they
did not in any way relate to an objectively reasonable need to protect
the police or the public from any immediate danger associated with the
weapon. In short there was no exigency requiring immediate action by
the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious
crime.
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8.
21 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429 n.10 (1984) (citing Quarles, 467 U.S. at
649). The Quarles Court referred to Miranda warnings as prophylactic and "not them-
selves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that
the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected." Quarles, 467 U.S. at
654 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)). Holding that Miranda
warnings were not constitutionally mandated, the Quarles Court found "that the need
for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs
the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination." Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657.
22 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 456. "In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one con-
fronting these officers, where spontaneity... is necessarily the order of the day.., we
do not believe that... Miranda [should] ... be applied in all its rigor...." Id. at 656.
23 Id. at 655-56. But see Marc Schuyler Reiner, Note, The Public Safety Exception to
Miranda: Analyzing Subjective Motivation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2377 (1995) (arguing that
the Quarles test requires analysis of the officer's subjective motivation). Justice Mar-
shall referred to the New York Court of Appeals finding that the officers who arrested
Quarles were not concerned about any threat to either their own safety or to the
safety of the public. Id. at 675-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
24 Id. at 677 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 678.
[Vol. 2:63
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no longer apply Miranda with clarity.26 Moreover, he found that
the decision "invites the government to prosecute through the use
of what necessarily are coerced statements.
'
"27
Second, the dissent indicated that Miranda, in interpreting the
United States Constitution's Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause, 2 established a constitutional presumption that statements
made during custodial interrogations are compelled.
29 As such,
they violate the Fifth Amendment and are inadmissible in criminal
prosecution. 0 Under Miranda, the prosecution may rebut this pre-
sumption after demonstrating that the police informed the suspect
of his Miranda rights and the suspect "knowingly and intelligently"
waived them.31 According to Justice Marshall, the Quarles majority
never addressed this presumption, and it failed to establish that
public safety interrogations are less likely to be coerced than other
32interrogation.
Third, the dissent asserted that the Quarles holding would al-
low law enforcement officers to deliberately withhold Miranda
warnings in an effort to obtain information from suspects who, if so
advised, would otherwise refuse to respond to interrogation.
33 The
dissent argued that law enforcement officers were not required to
choose between public safety and admissibility. "The prosecution
does not always lose the use of incriminating information revealed
in these situations. After consulting with counsel, a suspect may
well volunteer to repeat his statement in hopes of gaining a
favorable plea bargain or more lenient sentence.
34 In the dis-
sent's view, a calculation of the costs of the public should not over-
ride the Fifth Amendment's absolute protection against self-
incrimination. "Indeed, were constitutional adjudication always
conducted in such an ad hoc manner, the Bill of Rights would be a
most unreliable protector of individual liberties.
35
Essentially, Quarles holds that answers to questions posed while
under custodial interrogation may be admitted into evidence when
made without the benefit of Miranda warnings where there is a
threat to the safety of a crime victim, the public, or the police.
26 Id. at 679.
27 Id. at 681.
28 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
29 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 683 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 684.
33 Id. at 685.
34 Id. at 687.
35 Id. at 688.
1998]
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Such a threat may arise when a weapon is inexplicably absent and
police have substantial reason to believe it is in a place where it
may be used by an innocent third party, or more importantly,
where it may be used by a confederate of the suspect.36 If the ex-
ception is applicable, police may inquire as to the location of weap-
ons even after they arrest and handcuff the suspect.3 7
Numerous questions were left unanswered by Quarles: should
the exception apply to weapons other than guns? Should it apply
to dangerous substances other than weapons? Should it apply if a
substantial gap in time exists between the use or disposition of the
weapon and the questioning? Should it apply to protect potential
victims of crime or hostages involved in ongoing crimes? How
great must the danger be to trigger applications of the exception?
Must the weapon be in a public place or may the exception be
applied in private homes? Have the concerns of the Quarles dissent
become reality?
II. THE UNANSWERED QUARLES QUESTIONS
A. Can Police Routinely Ask a Suspect if He or She Is Armed With
a Gun?
In Quarles, the police arrested a suspect alleged to have been
armed while committing a rape.3 When arrested, Quarles wore an
empty holster but had no gun. ° It was reasonable for the police to
believe that he had disposed of the weapon in the brief time be-
tween the rape and his apprehension. It was also reasonable for
police to inquire as to the location of the gun. Other jurisdictions
have denied motions to suppress statements based on equally com-
pelling facts (e.g., a likelihood that a person was armed or a
weapon was nearby). o
36 The Quarles Court indicated that "[s]o long as the gun was concealed some-
where in the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed
more than one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a
customer or employee might later come upon it." Id. at 657.
37 People v. Sims, 853 P.2d 992, 1000 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2782
(1994); State v. Duncan, 866 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Dempsey, 514
N.W.2d 56 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (unpublished opinion). Of course, other factual cir-
cumstances not mentioned here may also produce the required danger to safety
which permits questioning without the benefit of Miranda warnings.
38 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 651-52.
39 Id. at 652.
40 See, e.g., United States v. Watkins, 12 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished
opinion) (responding to a report of gunfire in a mobile home park and finding a
mobile home with windows shot out and wounded man inside, police werejustified in
asking the suspect about the presence of a gun); United States v. Kelly, 991 F.2d 1308
[Vol. 2:63
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Some courts, however, have expanded the reach of Quarles.
For example, courts have admitted into evidence responses to po-
lice questions regarding the location of a weapon where no facts
indicated that the suspect was armed.41 In United States v. Ron-
ayne,12 the police arrested and handcuffed Ronayne after he made
a cocaine sale." Upon police inquiry, he directed them to his gun
located in the pocket of his jacket which had come off during a
struggle with the police.4" The police clearly had the right to
search Ronayne pursuant to a lawful arrest, including hisjacket. In
Ronayne the court failed to articulate the precise circumstances
where the public's safety was compromised, but then permitted the
pre-Miranda questioning. Was it objectively reasonable for the
court to assume that all alleged drug dealers may be armed? The
court in United States v. Edwards45 suggests that it was.
In Edwards, the Seventh Circuit held that the exception al-
lowed police to ask a suspect arrested for selling drugs if he was
armed."6 The court reasoned that drug dealers pose a danger to
arresting officers because they "are known to arm themselves, par-
ticularly when making a sale . . .47
(7th Cir. 1993) (person stopped for speeding had ammunition in his pocket); United
States v. Lawrence, 952 F.2d 1034 (8th Cir. ), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1011 (1992) (gun
thrown away while suspect was being pursued); United States v. Knox, 950 F.2d 516
(8th Cir. 1991) (suspect's jacket contained a loaded magazine for a .38 caliber pistol);
People v. Melvin, 591 N.Y.S.2d 454 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1992) (numerous people were
present at scene of shooting where man admitted to shooting the deceased and police
asked the location of the gun).
In United States v. Johnson, No. 90-50676, 1993 WL 114861 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 1993)
(unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 882 (1993), police questions about weap-
ons were held to fall within the exception. Although the police had no indication
thatJohnson was armed or had recently been armed, the court found Quarles applica-
ble on the grounds that Johnson was in a high crime area, at a late hour, near an
open liquor store, and appeared as if he was about to be involved in a robbery. Id. at
*1-*2. See Stauffer v. Zavaris, 37 F.3d 1495 (10th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion)
(holding that pre-Miranda questions regarding weapons were deemed proper under
Quarles where suspect fled from a car containing two holsters and one handgun on
the front seat); State v. Lopez, 652 A.2d 696, 698 (N.H. 1994) (the exception applied
where suspect in two shootings, which occurred within a short time of arrest, was
wearing an empty shoulder holster when arrested).
41 See United States v. Ronayne, No. 94-1374-78, 1995 WL 258137 (6th Cir. May 2,
1995), affd, 53 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 1970) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2631 (1995); United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v.
DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989).
42 Ronayne, No. 94-1373-78.
43 Id. at *1-*2.
44 Id.
45 885 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1989).
46 Id. at 384.
47 Id. See State v. Harris, 384 S.E.2d 50, 54 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), affd, 391 S.E.2d
1998]
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
United States v. Brutzman48 provides the clearest example of the
exception's expansion. In Brutzman, ten police officers executed a
search warrant of the home and office of Warren Brutzman, a con-
victed felon, who was suspected of mail and wire fraud arising from
a telemarketing business.49  One of the ten officers asked
Brutzman if there was a weapon on the premises. 50 Brutzman dis-
closed that there was a shotgun in the closet.51
In essence, because Brutzman was a convicted felon, the state-
ment and shotgun were admitted at trial and the questioning at the
scene was proper. Despite the overwhelming presence of police at
the scene, the fact that the police had no reason to believe
Brutzman was armed and that the purpose of the search was to
locate evidence of mail and wire fraud, not weapons, the appellate
court found the question permissible under Quarles.52 The state-
ment made in response to pre-Mirandized questioning was instru-
mental in convicting Brutzman of felonious possession of a
firearm. 51 Similarly, in United States v. DeSantis,54 the Ninth Circuit
explicitly stated that "l[t] he fact that [police] had no reason to be-
lieve that [the suspect] was armed and dangerous . . .is of no
consequence. 55
Initially, Quarles was limited to situations where particular facts
led officers to believe that a threat to public safety existed. Ron-
ayne, Brutzman, and DeSantis encourage police to routinely ask sus-
pects whether they are armed. Such routine questioning
represents a clear expansion of the exception. These decisions, in
effect, have labeled virtually any situation a threat to public safety.
187 (N.C. 1990) (court, under Quarles, permitted question about existence and loca-
tion of weapons because officer testified that, in his experience, people are armed in
at least 85% of drug transactions).
48 No. 93-50839, 1994 WL 721798 (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 1994) (unpublished opinion),
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1077 (1995).





54 870 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989).
55 Id. at 539. Similarly, in Fleming v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1992), the
police responded to a bank's silent alarm. Id. at 1110. Prior to confirming that a
robbery had taken place, the police observed two men in a field, one holding a pistol,
and the other bent over on the ground holding his wounded arm. Id. at 1110-11.
The police did not know how the wounded man had been shot, whether he was a
crime victim or suspect, or about the nearby bank robbery at which a robber was shot
and had escaped. Id. at 1111, 1114. Yet the court concluded it was proper to ask the
wounded man about the location of his gun. Id. at 1114.
[Vol. 2:63
1998] THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION 71
Thus, it is always reasonable for police to inquire as to the location
of weapons.
B. Does the Exception Apply to Questions Concerning Other Weapons,
Drugs, Needles, and Other Suspects?
Courts have extended the exception to allow questioning
about weapons other than guns, drugs, and hypodermic needles.
For example, although Quarles involved an officer's inquiry as to
the location of a gun, the courts have found pre-Miranda questions
appropriate that seek to procure the location of a knife.56
In United States v. Carrillo,57 the police asked a suspected drug
seller, before conducting an inventory search, whether "he had any
drugs or needles on his person."58 The trial court found his re-
sponse, "[n]o, I don't use drugs, I sell them," admissible.59 The
appellate court affirmed, finding an objectively reasonable need to
protect officers from needle pricks or skin irritations resulting
from drug contact.6" Thus Carillo justifies a routine pre-search,
pre-Miranda, inquiry as to possession of drugs or drug parapherna-
lia. Such questioning is appropriate regardless of the existence of
facts suggesting that the suspect used drugs or was carrying them.
This ruling should be narrowed to apply only to instances involving
arrested drug sellers or to instances where police reasonably fear
that the suspect has drugs or needles on his person.
However, in United States v. Cox,61 the Fourth Circuit applied
an even broader rule, permitting questions as to drug use. The
court in Cox stated that the exception permitted police to ask a
suspect if he was a heroin user after a search uncovered drug resi-
56 People v. Cole, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (Quarles applicable
where, following report that a man attempted a kidnapping by holding a knife to a
victim's throat, police chased and caught the suspect and immediately asked him the
location of his knife); Ohio v. Jergens, No. 13294, 1993 WL 333649 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 3, 1993) (the exception applies where, the day after his wife's death, a suspect in
the stalking murder was asked, upon arrest, about the location of the knife used in
the murder); see also State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1994) (the court found
Quarles inapplicable to police questioning of stabbing suspect as to where he obtained
the knife used because officers were already in possession of the knife, not because
the weapon was something other than a gun).
57 16 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 1994).
58 Id. at 1049.
59 Id. In fact, the officer in Carrillo testified that it was his policy to ask such a
question before conducting any search, regardless of the existence of any facts sug-
gesting that the suspect used or was carrying drugs. Id.
60 Id.
61 No. 90-5853, 1992 WL 29136 (4th Cir. Feb. 20, 1992) (unpublished opinion),
cert. denied, 504 U.S. 928 (1992).
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due and paraphernalia in the suspect's car.62 The Cox court found
the inquiry reasonable because drug users often act irrationally,
and, therefore, pose a threat to police officers' safety.6 3
Questioning to secure public safety may also refer to matters
other than weapons or drugs. For example, in State v. Leone,64 the
court permitted questions as to the location of a wounded police
officer,6 5 and the person whom Leone claimed had shot the of-
ficer.66 Leone's statements were deemed voluntary since police did
not draw their guns and did not apply physical force.67 The trial
court found that Leone exercised his rational intellect and free will
in making these statements. 68 The court further noted that Leone
made unsolicited statements that someone else had shot a police
officer, and that he stated to one officer "go ahead and pull the
trigger if you're man enough. 69
In sum, Quarles has been extended to pre-Miranda questions
involving drugs,7" drug paraphernalia,7 1 drug use,7 2 and the loca-
tion of a wounded officer and the shooter of that officer.73
C. Does Quarles Apply Only to Public Places?
Although the exception applies to threats to safety in a public
place, 4 the Quarles rationale logically allows questioning any time
62 Id. at *4.
63 Id. at *9.
64 581 A.2d 394 (Me. 1990).
65 Id. at 396. The trial court suppressed these answers as being involuntary prod-
ucts of police coercion, in violation of the Fifth Amendment because the arresting
officers obtained these statements after pounding Leone's head on the ground sev-
eral times, aiming a gun at his head, and threatening to kill him. Id.
66 Id. at 397. The court reasoned that the circumstances of an armed man threat-
ening police, an officer's telephone message that he had been shot, and the inability
of the officers to find their wounded fellow officer in dense woods made it "reason-
able ... to ask Leone if he was alone and about the gun.... After Leone's later
statement that another person had shot Officer Payne, it was also reasonable for the
officers to inquire about the identity of that other person." Id. See, e.g., Hill v. State,
598 A.2d 784, 785 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (police chased three suspected armed
robbers into a museum complex and caught two of them; it was held proper to ask
one of the arrested men where the third anned man was).
67 Leone, 581 A.2d at 397.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 396.
70 United States v. Carillo, 16 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).
71 Id.
72 United States v. Cox, No. 90-5853, 1992 WL (4th Cir. Feb. 20, 1992), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 928 (1992) at *1.
73 Leone, 581 A.2d at 394.
74 The Court in a later case indicated that "[i]n New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649
(1984), we recognized a public safety exception to the usual Fifth Amendment rights
[Vol. 2:63
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the requisite safety concern is present regardless of whether the
location is public or private. For example, in United States v. Simp-
son,7 5 a suspect was alleged to have held a weapon to his stepchild's
head. 76 The Seventh Circuit in Simpson relied on Quarles to allow
officers to inquire as to the location of the weapon after the sus-
pect had been arrested in his apartment. 77 Conversely, in United
States v. Mobley,78 the court held the exception inapplicable where
the police asked a suspect, arrested in his home on drug charges,
whether there were any dangerous devices or weapons in the apart-
ment.79 Mobley told the officers that a weapon was hidden in his
bedroom closet and led them to it.8 The Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that the circumstances did not demonstrate the immediate
need for questioning because there was no threat to public safety.81
afforded by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) so that police could recover a
firearm which otherwise would have remained in a public area." Baltimore Dep't of
Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 488 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1988) (emphasis added).
75 974 F.2d 845 (7th Cir. 1992).
76 Id. at 846.
77 Id. at 847.
78 40 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 1994).
79 Id. at 691, 693. But see United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989)
(suspect's home); People v. Childs, 651 N.E.2d 252 (Ill. 1995), cert. denied sub nom.
Childs v. Illinois, 516 U.S. 1134 (1996) (apartment of another person); People v.
Sims, 853 P.2d 992 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2782 (1994) (motel room);
Missouri v. Duncan, 866 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (home); State v. Harris, 384
S.E.2d 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (outside motel room); State v. Leone, 581 A.2d 394
(Me. 1990) (wooded rural area).
80 Mobley, 40 F.3d at 691.
81 Id. at 693. Police arrested a naked Mobley when he responded to a knock at his
door. Id. at 690. He clearly was not armed. Id. Police made an initial survey of the
apartment to be sure that no one else was present. Id. Police asked Mobley about the
existence of a weapon after he got dressed and was being led away from the apart-
ment. Id. at 691. Despite the Quarles violation, the Mobley court affirmed his convic-
tion because the error was harmless. Id. at 694.
In United States v. Raborn, 872 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth Circuit explained
its reasoning for finding Quarles inapplicable. In Raborn, police conducting a drug
surveillance of a building in an isolated rural area engaged in a car chase of a truck
leaving the building. Id. at 592. Seven officers stopped the vehicle. Id. One of the
occupants wore a holster with a gun in it. Id. He removed the gun and placed it
somewhere in the vehicle. Id. The police required all of the occupants to exit. Id.
The occupants were arrested and the police searched for the gun but did not find it.
Id. The police asked the man with the empty holster where the gun was located and
he told them. Id. The appellate court concluded that the exception did not justify
the question asked because "the gun was [not] hidden in a place to which the public
had access. Raborn's truck, where the police officers believed the gun to be, had
already been seized and only the police officers had access to the truck." Id. at 595.
Quarles was inapplicable, not because the truck was in a place inaccessible to the pub-
lic, but rather, because the gun presented no danger to anyone-public or police. Id.
The gun was properly admitted because it would inevitably have been discovered dur-
ing the police inventory search of the truck. Id.
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Several courts have stressed that the exception requires ques-
tioning related to a danger occurring in a place accessible to the
public.8 2 Although there is language in Quarles that supports this
argument, 3 it is not consistent with the reasoning of Quarles, which
should logically allow questioning to protect police officers or
others present at the scene of an arrest regardless of whether it
occurs in a public or a private place.
D. Does Quarles Apply After Giving a Suspect Miranda Warnings?
The exception allows for the introduction at trial of state-
ments and related evidence obtained by inquiring of individuals in
police custody despite the failure of police to give Miranda warn-
ings before asking questions.8 4 In addition, some courts have ap-
plied Quarles to allow questioning of individuals about public safety
who had already received, but had not waived, their Miranda
rights.
8 5
In Edwards v. Arizona, 6 the Supreme Court held that an ac-
cused who had been Mirandized and made a request to speak with
counsel "[could] not [be] subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel ha[d] been made available to him, unless
82 In Edwards v. United States, 619 A.2d 33 (D.C. Ct. App. 1993), the police arrested
a suspect who, moments earlier, threatened several people with a rifle. Id. at 34. The
suspect, pursued by police, entered a partly occupied, unlocked, somewhat derelict,
apartment building. Id. at 34-35. After arrest, the suspect responded to a question
about the location of the weapon. Id. at 35. The court found that the weapon was in
a place accessible to the public in accordance with Quarles. Id. at 36. Some apart-
ments were occupied, the building's front door was unlatched, and vagrants used the
building. Id. at 37. In Wisconsin v. Hoag, No. 92-2523-CR, 1993 WL 245669 (Wisc. Ct.
App. May 12, 1993) (unpublished opinion), the court recognized that the exception
"would not apply in a situation where there is an area readily accessible to the public
and there is no exigency requiring immediate police action." Id. at *3 n.3 (citations
omitted). Nevertheless, the Hoag court held that Quarles applied to the questioning
of a suspect in an armed bank robbery who no longer had the gun used in the rob-
bery and who had been pursued by a citizen from the bank to a wooded area. Id. at
*1.
83 In Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8, the Supreme Court distinguished Orozco v. Texas,
394 U.S. 324 (1969), in which the questioning of the suspect occurred at his board-
inghouse in the middle of the night with armed officers asking numerous questions
regarding a murder and whether the arrestee owned a gun. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659
n.8 (1984). Orozco is distinguishable from Quarles beyond whether the site of the ques-
tioning was a public or private place. The questioning in Orozco was extended and
concerned the crime, not merely the location of the gun. Because Orozco was ar-
rested a mere four hours after the murder, logically, brief questioning of Orozco
solely regarding the location of the gun used in the murder would have been proper
under Quarles.
84 Id. at 659.
85 See, e.g., United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989).
86 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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the accused himself initiate [d] further communication ... with the
police."8 7 Nevertheless, the exception has, at least in one case,
been extended to permit a question otherwise barred by Edwards.88
In United States v. DeSantis, Rocco DeSantis had been arrested
at his home, pursuant to a warrant, and requested to speak to
counsel.89 The police accompanied a partially clothed DeSantis to
his bedroom so he could dress.9" An officer asked him if there
were any weapons in the bedroom. 1 DeSantis stated that there was
a gun and identified its location.92 The officer seized the weapon.
The trial court denied DeSantis' subsequent motion to suppress his
statement and the recovered gun.9" The Ninth Circuit affirmed,
reasoning that the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to
fear for his safety in DeSantis' bedroom.94 Thus, the Quarles excep-
tion was applicable despite DeSantis' invocation of his right to
counsel.95
By contrast, in People v. Laliberte,96 the Illinois Appellate Court
held it was improper for police to ask further questions of an arres-
tee who repeatedly asked for an attorney.97 In that case police sus-
pected Laliberte of kidnapping a one-year-old child and
abandoning her in the woods.98 The court rejected the state's ar-
gument that the danger to the child justified evidentiary use of the
defendant's answers to questions asked after he had been
Mirandized and then requested to speak to counsel.99
E. Have Courts Created New Exceptions to Miranda?
The Quarles dissent, as well as numerous critical commenta-
tors, expressed concern that Quarles created an exception to the
previous "bright line" rule of Miranda, which banned the use of
compelled statements.100 The exception, it is feared, could lead to
87 Id. at 484-85.
88 United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1989).
89 Id. at 537-38. There was dispute as to whether DeSantis actually requested to
speak to counsel. The court accepted DeSantis' version of the matter. Id. at 538 n.1.




94 Id. at 541.
95 Id. at 539, 541.
96 615 N.E.2d 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
97 Id. at 821.
98 Id. at 816.
99 Id. at 819-20, 822-23.
100 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 663-86 (1984). (O'Connor, J., concurring
and dissenting in part); See, e.g., Steven Andrew Drizin, Fifth Amendment-Will the Pub-
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the creation of other exceptions to Miranda. However, this con-
cern has not been realized in the thirteen years since Quarles was
decided. It is true that several courts have utilized a "rescue doc-
trine"'' exception to Miranda to permit questioning of suspects in
situations involving hostages or kidnapped persons. However,
these cases logically fall under Quarles because they include a sub-
stantial threat to someone's safety and involve emergency
situations.1
0 2
Another new exception to Quarles may be found where courts
have ruled that police are permitted to ask questions in order to
"clarify the nature of the situation" they face.' ° For example, in
lic Safety Exception Swallow the Miranda Exclusionary Rule?, 75 CRIM. L. & CIMINOLOGY
692, 712 (1984); Maria Belson, Note "Public-Safety" Exception to Miranda: The Supreme
Court Writes Away Rights, 61 CHI.-KENr L. REv. 577, 591 (1985); Daniel Brian Yeager,
Note, The Public Safety Exception to Miranda Careening Through the Lower Courts, 40 U.
FLA. L. REv. 989, 992-93 (1988).
101 The "rescue doctrine" was developed primarily by California courts to allow into
evidence a suspect's responses to police questioning in situations in which the suspect
has not received Miranda warnings and the police undertake the interrogation for the
purpose of saving a life. The doctrine was first announced pre-Miranda in People v.
Modesto, 398 P.2d 753 (Cal. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Modesto v. Nelson, 389 U.S.
1009 (1967) and continued to be utilized post-Miranda in People v. Riddle, 83 Cal. App.
3d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Riddle v. California, 440 U.S. 937
(1979). The Riddle court indicated that the rescue doctrine, also known as the "pri-
vate safety" doctrine, applied in situations where (1) there was an urgent need for the
information which could not be obtained in any other way; (2) the possibility existed
of saving a human life by rescuing a person whose life is in danger; and (3) the rescue
is the primary purpose and motive behind the interrogation. Id. at 576. The doctrine
has been adopted by other jurisdictions as well. See State v. Kunkel, 404 N.W.2d 69
(Wis. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 929 (1987); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93 (Minn.
1992), cert. denied sub nom. Provost v. Minnesota, 507 U.S. 929 (1993); United States v.
DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1989).
The private safety exception is much more narrow than the Quarles exception.
The danger must involve a threat to a specific person's life rather than a general
threat to public safety. The police, when acting in accordance with the private safety
exception, must have a subjective intention to rescue the person in danger, whereas
the Quarles test is an objective one. The private safety exception requires that the
information be unavailable by any other means, whereas the Quarles exception does
not.
102 The rescue doctrine is necessary only if Quarles is limited to situations involving
threats to public safety. Given that the basic rationale of Quarles does not justify such
a limitation, there is probably no need for the rescue doctrine. Regardless of the
nature of the threat to safety, whether to a particular individual or to the public in
general, the Quarles objective approach should be favored in determining whether
there was a threat to safety which permitted the questioning of a suspect without
receiving Miranda warnings, and whether the scope of the questioning was limited to
that which was necessary to protect safety interests. Nevertheless, some courts have
continued to reject the rescue doctrine. See, e.g., Laliberte, 615 N.E.2d at 813.
103 People v. Luna, 559 N.Y.S.2d 377 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1990) (citing People v.
Huffman, 359 N.E.2d 353, 356 (N.Y. 1976)).
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People v. Luna1 °4 police responded to a restaurant's burglar alarm,
found Luna in the closed restaurant, and caught him after a
chase.'0 ' As they subdued Luna, one of the officers found a bulge
in Luna's pocket and asked him what it was.1" 6 Luna answered that
he obtained it in the restaurant and that two other persons had
been there with him.10 7 The object turned out to be a roll of
money.1 0 8 The Appellate Division, Second Department, rejected
Luna's argument that admission of his answer violated Miranda,'
0 9
and permitted officers at the scene of an arrest to ask questions
designed to clarify the situation confronting them.
110
F. Does the Exception Apply if There is a Gap in Time Between the Use
of a Weapon and the Arrest?
In Quarles, police inquired as to the weapon's location a few
minutes after it was allegedly used. 1' However, the exception has
been properly applied to inquiries about weapons where there ex-
isted a gap in time between the suspect's alleged possession of the
weapon and the police questioning.
12
A compelling basis for pre-Mirandized questioning exists so
long as there is a reasonable basis to believe that there is a danger
to public safety. In People v. Sims,11 the police arrested a suspect
for an armed robbery and murder, which had occurred two weeks
earlier.114 The suspect was believed to possess a handgun and
machine gun in his hotel room." 5 The court found that the dan-
ger to the police was inherent because the suspect was sought for
the commission of violent armed felonies and was believed to be
armed at the time of apprehension." 6 The danger did not fail to
exist merely because the crimes occurred two weeks earlier.
Likewise, in United States v. Thurston'17 the defendant bought a





109 Id. at 378.
110 Id.
111 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 652 (1984).
112 See People v. Sims, 853 P.2d 992 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Sims v. Califor-
nia, 114 S. Ct. 2782 (1994); United States v. Thurston, 774 F. Supp. 666 (D. Me.
1991).
113 Sims, 853 P.2d at 992.
114 Id. at 998-1000.
115 Id. at 1000.
116 Id. at 1019.
117 774 F. Supp. 666.
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handgun in the morning and used it to threaten his wife. He then
drank heavily during the day and was arrested at night.
1 18
Although many hours had passed since the gun was used to
threaten Thurston's wife, the public safety exception was applica-
ble because the gun could have been dangerous if found by some-
one else or the defendant upon his release from custody. 19 The
danger to the public in that case arose from a possibility of subse-
quent use of the weapon, regardless of when it might have been
discovered, and regardless of the gap in time between the use of
weapon and the questioning.
G. How Substantial May the Police Questioning Be Under Quarles?
In Quarles, the police officer asked a single question regarding
the location of the suspect's gun. 120 After retrieving the gun, the
officer then read the defendant his Miranda rights. 121 The Quarles
Court indicated that "Officer Kraft asked only the question neces-
sary to locate the missing gun before advising respondent of his
rights."1 22 The Court distinguished these events from those in
Orozco v. Texas,121 where police officers questioned a suspect at
length in his boardinghouse room regarding the location of a gun
used in a murder.1 24 The Quarles Court stated that because the
questions in Orozco were "clearly investigatory [in that] they did not
in any way relate to an objectively reasonable need to protect the
police or public from any immediate danger associated with the
weapon," 12 5 they differed from those in Quarles which related to
immediate dangers associated with the weapon seized.
126
The bulk of the cases which followed the Quarles exception
were instances where the police asked a single question or a small
number of questions about a weapon, or other dangers, and then
ceased further questioning until Miranda rights were read. 127 In
118 Id. at 667.
119 Id. at 667-68.
120 467 U.S. at 652.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 659.
123 394 U.S. 324 (1968).
124 Id. at 324-25.
125 467 U.S. at 659 n.8. In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), the Supreme
Court, within a month of deciding Quarles, explained the public safety exception as
allowing "questions essential to elicit information necessary to neutralize the threat to
the public. Once such information has been obtained, the suspect must be given the
standard warnings." Id. at 429 n.1.
126 Id.
127 See, e.g., Hill v. State, 598 A.2d 784, 786 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (two ques-
tions before giving of Miranda warnings); People v. Howard, 556 N.Y.S.2d 940 (App.
[Vol. 2:63
1998] THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION 79
instances where questioning extended beyond the scope permitted
by Quarles, the answers were suppressed.1 28 For example, in People
v. Roundtree,1 29 where shots were fired during a fight between two
men in a car, the court suppressed a defendant's answer to a police
question regarding the ownership of a suitcase in the car.
3' The
Roundtree court reasoned that the police officer "had secured con-
trol of the scene before he asked the question. Furthermore ...
[n] either the suitcase [n] or its contents posed a threat to the pub-
lic safety ... ."131
Similarly, in State v. McCarthy'3 2 the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska found the exception inapplicable to questions regarding
the whereabouts of a separate murder suspect.' 33 The court con-
cluded that there was no immediate danger requiring the suspect
to be questioned without receiving Miranda warnings. 3 Similarly,
in State v. Deases,135 the questioning of a prisoner regarding where
he obtained a shank (i.e., knife) that he used to stab another in-
mate was deemed inapplicable because the shank was in the prison
officials' possession at the time of questioning.1 36 The Supreme
Court of Iowa held that there was no immediate threat to public
safety, thus, the pre-Miranda questioning was not justified.
137
Div. 2d Dep't 1990) (limited questions followed by Miranda warnings); People v.
Luna, 559 N.Y.S.2d 377, 377 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1990) (one question before Miranda
warnings).
In many cases, the opinions indicated that one question or a few questions were
asked, but no mention was made of the giving of Miranda warnings. See, e.g., State v.
Duncan, 866 S.W. 2d 510, 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (one question); People v. Lopez,
652 A.2d 696, 698 (Sup. Ct. N.H. 1994) (one question); State v. Ingram, 596 N.Y.S.2d
352 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1991) (two questions).
128 In United States v. Eaton, 676 F. Supp. 362, 365-66 (D. Me. 1988), the court found
the question to a person arrested at a drug sale, regarding the reason for the arres-
tee's presence at the site of the arrest, outside the scope of questioning permitted by
Quarles. Id. See State v. Cross, No. A-93-368, 1993 WL 311554, at *4 (Neb. App. Ct.
Aug. 17, 1993) (unpublished opinion) (no immediate need for question about loca-
tion of a gun when suspect and accomplice were in custody after car chase ended in a
snowdrift on a dead end road); United States v. Gonzalez, 864 F. Supp. 375, 382
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (two questions allowed when suspect in gun battle with police
claimed to be a police officer and crime victim; subsequent questions were held not
justified under Quarles).
129 482 N.E.2d 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
130 Id. at 698.
131 Id. at 697-98.
132 353 N.W.2d 14 (Neb. 1984).
133 Id. at 16-17.
134 Id.
135 518 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1994).
136 Id. at 790-91.
137 Id. at 791. Accord People v. Ratliff, 584 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1992) (police responding to an armed robbery at a private social club asked one sus-
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In a limited number of cases, courts have improperly admitted
into evidence answers to numerous investigatory questions. The
most serious example of such an erroneous application of the ex-
ception occurred in Fleming v. Collins.13 In Fleming, after respond-
ing to a bank alarm, police questioned a man they observed in a
field holding a pistol over another man.1"9 Police approached, or-
dered the man to drop his gun, and ordered both men to put their
hands up.'4 ° Fleming, the man on the ground, stated that he
could not raise his arm because he had been shot. 4' The officer
asked who shot him, 14 2 and the suspect said it was the man at the
bank.'43 At that point, the officers realized that Fleming was a sus-
pect in the bank robbery and that the other man was merely an
armed bystander who followed Fleming from the bank and cap-
tured him.4 The officer continued to inquire as to who was with
Fleming, the location of the guns and whether anyone at the bank
was shot.'4 5 The trial court admitted Fleming's answers to all the
questions and the appellate court affirmed.' 46
The appellate court in Fleming found that the Quarles excep-
tion permitted all of the questions because the officers initially did
not know the location of the accomplices or whether Fleming was a
victim of a crime or a suspect. 147 The majority opinion asserted
that Quarles was satisfied because the questioning ended once
Fleming stated that he had acted alone. 4 ' The majority chose to
look at the situation as a whole to discover whether the danger
permitted pre-Mirandized questioning.149 The dissent, in contrast,
concluded that the safety concerns were satisfied once the police
pect the number and whereabouts of other robbers not yet apprehended); Hill v.
State, 598 A.2d 784, 785 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (the court allowed a question
asked of a suspected armed robber regarding the location of another armed partici-
pant in the robbery who had just evaded arrest).
138 954 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1992).
139 Id. at 1110.






146 Id. at 1114. (Williams, J. & Brown, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 1113. The officers had already frisked Fleming so they knew he was no
longer armed. Id. at 1115.
148 The majority opinion quotes from the officer's suppression hearing testimony,
which includes this testimony rather than the trial testimony. Id. at 1111, 1114-15.
The dissent points out that the suppression hearing testimony was never heard by the
trial jury but that, of course, the trial testimony was. Id. at 1114.
149 Id. at 1113-14.
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knew that Fleming was fleeing from a bank robbery, had dropped
his gun, and was not armed.15 ° Thus, the dissent argued that the
officer's continued questioning was improper.
15
Quarles requires that the questioning cease and Miranda rights
be read as soon as the threat to public safety ends. Therefore, the
majority in Fleming erred by permitting all five minutes of question-
ing to be admitted. Once the safety concerns were alleviated,
Fleming should have been Mirandized. The Fleming dissent rea-
soned consistently with Quarles by approving the questioning di-
rected at public safety and disapproving the use of answers to
questions no longer necessary to secure the public safety. Accord-
ingly, all of Fleming's statements made after it was clear that no
threat to the public safety existed should have been suppressed.
III. CONCLUSION
In creating an exception to Miranda, the Quarles Court articu-
lated a narrow set of circumstances in which police officers are per-
mitted to engage in pre-Miranda questioning. The exception
allows questioning of suspects before they are informed of their
Miranda rights whenever a court may objectively conclude that of-
ficers are faced with a situation endangering the police or the pub-
lic safety. However, subsequent trial and appellate court decisions
have implemented Quarles in ways inconsistent with its rationale.
Police officers may now question suspects where dangers arise from
the presence of guns, or other weapons, drugs or drug parapherna-
lia, as to the possible presence of other suspects or crime victims
and where questioning will result in searches beyond the scope of a
valid search warrant. In addition, Quarles may be applied regard-
less of whether the danger exists in a private or public setting.
Questions permitted by Quarles have generally been limited to
those designed to protect against danger to the public or to police,
and no further questioning has been permitted without providing
the warnings required by Miranda. Perhaps the greatest and most
unwarranted expansion of the exception involves court approval of
the practice of questioning suspects as to the location of weapons
or drugs regardless of whether there exists an objective reason to
believe that the particular suspect possessed or used same. These
150 Id. at 1115.
151 Id. According to the dissenting judges, Quarles never intended to allow police
questioning of this type: "How many thousands of unfortunate persons in totalitarian
countries have confessed at the end of the loaded barrel of a gun held by police
officers, whether or not they were guilty?" Id.
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departures dilute the Supreme Court's original rationale for creat-
ing the exception in Quarles.
